!==
!== cifsntdomain.txt for Samba release 2.2.0-alpha3 24 Mar 2001
!==
NT Domain Authentication
------------------------

Authors:	- Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton (lkcl@switchboard.net)
--------	- Paul Ashton                  (paul@argo.demon.co.uk)
		- Duncan Stansfield            (duncans@sco.com)

		  Copyright (C) 1997 Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton
		  Copyright (C) 1997 Paul Ashton
		  Copyright (C) 1997 Duncan Stansfield

Version:	0.024 (01Nov97)
--------

Distribution:	Unlimited and encouraged, for the purposes of implementation
-------------	and comments.  Feedback welcomed by the authors.

Liability:	Absolutely none accepted implicitly or explicitly, direct
----------	or consequentially, for use, abuse, misuse, lack of use,
		misunderstandings, mistakes, omissions, mis-information for
		anything in or not in, related to or not related to, or
		pertaining to this document, or anything else that a lawyer
		can think of or not think of.

Warning:	Please bear in mind that an incorrect implementation of this
--------	protocol can cause NT workstation to fail irrevocably, for
		which the authors accept no liability (see above).  Please
		contact your vendor if you have any problems.

Sources:	- Packet Traces from Netmonitor (Service Pack 1 and above)
--------	- Paul Ashton and Luke Leighton's other "NT Domain" doc.
		- CIFS documentation - cifs6.txt
		- CIFS documentation - cifsrap2.txt

Original:	http://mailhost.cb1.com/~lkcl/cifsntdomain.txt.
---------	(Controlled copy maintained by lkcl@switchboard.net)

Credits:	- Paul Ashton: loads of work with Net Monitor; 
--------	  understanding the NT authentication system;
		  reference implementation of the NT domain support on which
		  this document is originally based.
		- Duncan Stansfield: low-level analysis of MSRPC Pipes.
		- Linus Nordberg: producing c-code from Paul's crypto spec.
		- Windows Sourcer development team


Contents:
---------

   1) Introduction

   2) Structures and notes

      2.1) Notes
      2.3) Enumerations
      2.3) Structures

   3) Transact Named Pipe Header/Tail

      3.1) MSRPC Pipes
      3.2) Header
      3.3) Tail

   4) NTLSA Transact Named Pipe

      4.1) LSA Open Policy
      4.2) LSA Query Info Policy
      4.3) LSA Enumerate Trusted Domains
      4.4) LSA Open Secret
      4.5) LSA Close
      4.6) LSA Lookup SIDS
      4.7) LSA Lookup Names

   5) NETLOGON rpc Transact Named Pipe

      5.1) LSA Request Challenge
      5.2) LSA Authenticate 2
      5.3) LSA Server Password Set
      5.4) LSA SAM Logon
      5.5) LSA SAM Logoff

   6) \\MAILSLOT\NET\NTLOGON

      6.1) Query for PDC
      6.2) SAM Logon

   7) SRVSVC Transact Named Pipe

      7.1) Net Share Enum
      7.2) Net Server Get Info


Appendix:
---------

   A1) Cryptographic side of NT Domain Authentication
   
       A1.1) Definitions
       A1.2) Protocol
       A1.3) Comments

   A2) SIDs and RIDs

       A2.1) Well-known SIDs

             A2.1.1) Universal well-known SIDs
             A2.1.2) NT well-known SIDs

       A2.2) Well-known RIDS
      
             A2.2.1) Well-known RID users
             A2.2.2) Well-known RID groups
             A2.2.3) Well-known RID aliases



1) Introduction
---------------


This document contains information to provide an NT workstation with login
services, without the need for an NT server.

It should be possible to select a domain instead of a workgroup (in the NT
workstation's TCP/IP settings) and after the obligatory reboot, type in a
username, password, select a domain and successfully log in.  I would
appreciate any feedback on your experiences with this process, and any
comments, corrections and additions to this document.


The packets described here can be easily derived from (and are probably
better understood using) Netmon.exe.  You will need to use the version
of Netmon that matches your system, in order to correctly decode the
NETLOGON, lsarpc and srvsvc Transact pipes.  This document is derived from
NT Service Pack 1 and its corresponding version of Netmon.  It is intended
that an annotated packet trace be produced, which will likely be more
instructive than this document.

Also needed, to fully implement NT Domain Login Services, is the 
document describing the cryptographic part of the NT authentication.
This document is available from comp.protocols.smb; from the ntsecurity.net
digest and from the samba digest, amongst other sources.

A copy is available from:

http://ntbugtraq.rc.on.ca/SCRIPTS/WA.EXE?A2=ind9708&L=ntbugtraq&O=A&P=2935
http://mailhost.cb1.com/~lkcl/crypt.html


A c-code implementation, provided by Linus Nordberg <linus@incolumitas.se>
of this protocol is available from:

http://samba.org/cgi-bin/mfs/01/digest/1997/97aug/0391.html
http://mailhost.cb1.com/~lkcl/crypt.txt


Also used to provide debugging information is the Check Build version of
NT workstation, and enabling full debugging in NETLOGON.  This is
achieved by setting the following REG_SZ registry key to 0x1ffffff:

HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Netlogon\Parameters

- Incorrect direct editing of the registry can cause your machine to fail.
  Then again, so can incorrect implementation of this protocol.
  See "Liability:" above.


Bear in mind that each packet over-the-wire will have its origin in an
API call.  Therefore, there are likely to be structures, enumerations
and defines that are usefully documented elsewhere.


This document is by no means complete or authoritative.  Missing sections
include, but are not limited to:

- the meaning (and use by NT) of SIDs and RIDs.

- mappings of RIDs to usernames (and vice-versa).

- what a User ID is and what a Group ID is.

- the exact meaning/definition of various magic constants or enumerations.

- the reply error code and use of that error code when a workstation
  becomes a member of a domain (to be described later).  Failure to
  return this error code will make the workstation report that it is
  already a member of the domain.

- the cryptographic side of the NetrServerPasswordSet command, which would
  allow the workstation to change its password.  This password is used to
  generate the long-term session key.  [It is possible to reject this
  command, and keep the default workstation password].
   

2) Notes and Structures
-----------------------


2.1) Notes
----------

- In the SMB Transact pipes, some "Structures", described here, appear to be
  4-byte aligned with the SMB header, at their start.  Exactly which
  "Structures" need aligning is not precisely known or documented.

- In the UDP NTLOGON Mailslots, some "Structures", described here, appear to be
  2-byte aligned with the start of the mailslot, at their start.

- Domain SID is of the format S-revision-version-auth1-auth2...authN.
  e.g S-1-5-123-456-789-123-456.  the 5 could be a sub-revision.

- any undocumented buffer pointers must be non-zero if the string buffer it
  refers to contains characters.  exactly what value they should be is unknown.
  0x0000 0002 seems to do the trick to indicate that the buffer exists.  a
  NULL buffer pointer indicates that the string buffer is of zero length.
  If the buffer pointer is NULL, then it is suspected that the structure it
  refers to is NOT put into (or taken out of) the SMB data stream.  This is
  empirically derived from, for example, the LSA SAM Logon response packet,
  where if the buffer pointer is NULL, the user information is not inserted
  into the data stream.  Exactly what happens with an array of buffer pointers
  is not known, although an educated guess can be made.

- an array of structures (a container) appears to have a count and a pointer.
  if the count is zero, the pointer is also zero.  no further data is put
  into or taken out of the SMB data stream.  if the count is non-zero, then
  the pointer is also non-zero.  immediately following the pointer is the
  count again, followed by an array of container sub-structures.  the count
  appears a third time after the last sub-structure.

  
2.2) Enumerations
-----------------

- MSRPC Header type.  command number in the msrpc packet header

    MSRPC_Request:   0x00
    MSRPC_Response:  0x02
    MSRPC_Bind:      0x0B
    MSRPC_BindAck:   0x0C

- MSRPC Packet info.  the meaning of these flags is undocumented

    FirstFrag:     0x01 
    LastFrag:      0x02 
    NotaFrag:      0x04  
    RecRespond:    0x08  
    NoMultiplex:   0x10  
    NotForIdemp:   0x20  
    NotforBcast:   0x40  
    NoUuid:        0x80 


2.3) Structures
---------------

- sizeof VOID* is 32 bits.

- sizeof char is 8 bits.

- UTIME is 32 bits, indicating time in seconds since 01jan1970.  documented
  in cifs6.txt (section 3.5 page, page 30).

- NTTIME is 64 bits.  documented in cifs6.txt (section 3.5 page, page 30).

- DOM_SID (domain SID structure) :

        UINT32             num of sub-authorities in domain SID
        UINT8              SID revision number
        UINT8              num of sub-authorities in domain SID
        UINT8[6]           6 bytes for domain SID - Identifier Authority.
        UINT16[n_subauths] domain SID sub-authorities

  Note: the domain SID is documented elsewhere.

- STR (string) :

        char[]             null-terminated string of ascii characters.

- UNIHDR (unicode string header) :

        UINT16             length of unicode string
        UINT16             max length of unicode string
        UINT32             4 - undocumented.
   
- UNIHDR2 (unicode string header plus buffer pointer) :

        UNIHDR             unicode string header
        VOID*              undocumented buffer pointer

- UNISTR (unicode string) :

        UINT16[]           null-terminated string of unicode characters.

- NAME (length-indicated unicode string) :

        UINT32             length of unicode string
        UINT16[]           null-terminated string of unicode characters.

- UNISTR2 (aligned unicode string) :

        UINT8[]            padding to get unicode string 4-byte aligned
                           with the start of the SMB header.
        UINT32             max length of unicode string
        UINT32             0 - undocumented
        UINT32             length of unicode string
        UINT16[]           string of uncode characters.

- OBJ_ATTR (object attributes) :

        UINT32             0x18 - length (in bytes) including the length field.
        VOID*              0 - root directory (pointer)
        VOID*              0 - object name (pointer)
        UINT32             0 - attributes (undocumented)
        VOID*              0 - security descriptior (pointer)
        UINT32             0 - security quality of service
        
- POL_HND (LSA policy handle) :

    char[20]           policy handle

- DOM_SID2 (domain SID structure, SIDS stored in unicode) :

        UINT32             5 - SID type
        UINT32             0 - undocumented
        UNIHDR2            domain SID unicode string header
        UNISTR             domain SID unicode string

  Note:	there is a conflict between the unicode string header and the
	unicode string itself as to which to use to indicate string
	length.  this will need to be resolved.

  Note:	the SID type indicates, for example, an alias; a well-known group etc.
	this is documented somewhere.

- DOM_RID (domain RID structure) :

        UINT32             5 - well-known SID.  1 - user SID (see ShowACLs)
        UINT32             5 - undocumented
        UINT32             domain RID 
        UINT32             0 - domain index out of above reference domains
        

- LOG_INFO (server, account, client structure) :

  Note:	logon server name starts with two '\' characters and is upper case.

  Note:	account name is the logon client name from the LSA Request Challenge,
	with a $ on the end of it, in upper case.

        VOID*       undocumented buffer pointer
        UNISTR2     logon server unicode string
        UNISTR2     account name unicode string
        UINT16      sec_chan - security channel type
        UNISTR2     logon client machine unicode string

- CLNT_SRV (server, client names structure) :

  Note:	logon server name starts with two '\' characters and is upper case.

        VOID*       undocumented buffer pointer
        UNISTR2     logon server unicode string
        VOID*       undocumented buffer pointer
        UNISTR2     logon client machine unicode string

- CREDS (credentials + time stamp)

        char[8]     credentials
        UTIME       time stamp
    
- CLNT_INFO2 (server, client structure, client credentials) :

  Note: whenever this structure appears in a request, you must take a copy
	of the client-calculated credentials received, because they will be
	used in subsequent credential checks.  the presumed intention is to
	maintain an authenticated request/response trail.
        
        CLNT_SRV     client and server names
        UINT8[]      ???? padding, for 4-byte alignment with SMB header.
        VOID*        pointer to client credentials.
        CREDS        client-calculated credentials + client time

- CLNT_INFO (server, account, client structure, client credentials) :

  Note: whenever this structure appears in a request, you must take a copy
	of the client-calculated credentials received, because they will be
	used in subsequent credential checks.  the presumed intention is to
	maintain an authenticated request/response trail.
        
        LOG_INFO    logon account info
        CREDS       client-calculated credentials + client time

- ID_INFO_1 (id info structure, auth level 1) :

    VOID*         ptr_id_info_1
    UNIHDR        domain name unicode header
    UINT32        param control
    UINT64        logon ID
    UNIHDR        user name unicode header
    UNIHDR        workgroup name unicode header
    char[16]      arc4 LM OWF Password
    char[16]      arc4 NT OWF Password
    UNISTR2       domain name unicode string
    UNISTR2       user name unicode string
    UNISTR2       workstation name unicode string

- SAM_INFO (sam logon/logoff id info structure) :

  Note: presumably, the return credentials is supposedly for the server to
        verify that the credential chain hasn't been compromised.

        CLNT_INFO2  client identification/authentication info
        VOID*       pointer to return credentials.
        CRED        return credentials - ignored.
        UINT16      logon level
        UINT16      switch value

        switch (switch_value)
        case 1:
        {
            ID_INFO_1     id_info_1;
        }

- GID (group id info) :

        UINT32      group id
        UINT32      user attributes (only used by NT 3.1 and 3.51)

- DOM_REF (domain reference info) :

        VOID*                    undocumented buffer pointer.
        UINT32                   num referenced domains?
        VOID*                    undocumented domain name buffer pointer.
        UINT32                   32 - max number of entries
        UINT32                   4 - num referenced domains?

        UNIHDR2                  domain name unicode string header
        UNIHDR2[num_ref_doms-1]  referenced domain unicode string headers

        UNISTR                   domain name unicode string
        DOM_SID[num_ref_doms]    referenced domain SIDs

- DOM_INFO (domain info, levels 3 and 5 are the same)) :

        UINT8[]     ??? padding to get 4-byte alignment with start of SMB header
        UINT16      domain name string length * 2
        UINT16      domain name string length * 2
        VOID*       undocumented domain name string buffer pointer
        VOID*       undocumented domain SID string buffer pointer
        UNISTR2     domain name (unicode string)
        DOM_SID     domain SID

- USER_INFO (user logon info) :

    Note: it would be nice to know what the 16 byte user session key is for.

        NTTIME            logon time
        NTTIME            logoff time
        NTTIME            kickoff time
        NTTIME            password last set time
        NTTIME            password can change time
        NTTIME            password must change time

        UNIHDR            username unicode string header
        UNIHDR            user's full name unicode string header
        UNIHDR            logon script unicode string header
        UNIHDR            profile path unicode string header
        UNIHDR            home directory unicode string header
        UNIHDR            home directory drive unicode string header

        UINT16            logon count
        UINT16            bad password count

        UINT32            User ID
        UINT32            Group ID
        UINT32            num groups
        VOID*             undocumented buffer pointer to groups.

        UINT32            user flags
        char[16]          user session key

        UNIHDR            logon server unicode string header
        UNIHDR            logon domain unicode string header
        VOID*             undocumented logon domain id pointer
        char[40]          40 undocumented padding bytes.  future expansion?

        UINT32            0 - num_other_sids?
        VOID*             NULL - undocumented pointer to other domain SIDs.
        
        UNISTR2           username unicode string
        UNISTR2           user's full name unicode string
        UNISTR2           logon script unicode string
        UNISTR2           profile path unicode string
        UNISTR2           home directory unicode string
        UNISTR2           home directory drive unicode string

        UINT32            num groups
        GID[num_groups]   group info

        UNISTR2           logon server unicode string
        UNISTR2           logon domain unicode string

        DOM_SID           domain SID
        DOM_SID[num_sids] other domain SIDs?

- SH_INFO_1_PTR (pointers to level 1 share info strings):

Note:	see cifsrap2.txt section5, page 10.

	0 for shi1_type indicates a  Disk.
	1 for shi1_type indicates a  Print Queue.
	2 for shi1_type indicates a  Device.
	3 for shi1_type indicates an IPC pipe.
	0x8000 0000 (top bit set in shi1_type) indicates a hidden share.

        VOID*        shi1_netname - pointer to net name
        UINT32       shi1_type    - type of share.  0 - undocumented.
        VOID*        shi1_remark  - pointer to comment.

- SH_INFO_1_STR (level 1 share info strings) :

        UNISTR2      shi1_netname - unicode string of net name
        UNISTR2      shi1_remark  - unicode string of comment.

- SHARE_INFO_1_CTR :

    share container with 0 entries:

        UINT32        0 - EntriesRead
        UINT32        0 - Buffer

    share container with > 0 entries:

        UINT32                      EntriesRead
        UINT32                      non-zero - Buffer
        UINT32                      EntriesRead

        SH_INFO_1_PTR[EntriesRead]  share entry pointers
        SH_INFO_1_STR[EntriesRead]  share entry strings

        UINT8[]                     padding to get unicode string 4-byte
                                    aligned with start of the SMB header.
        UINT32                      EntriesRead
    	UINT32                      0 - padding

- SERVER_INFO_101 :

Note:	see cifs6.txt section 6.4 - the fields described therein will be
	of assistance here.  for example, the type listed below is the
	same as fServerType, which is described in 6.4.1.

	SV_TYPE_WORKSTATION        0x00000001  All workstations
	SV_TYPE_SERVER             0x00000002  All servers
	SV_TYPE_SQLSERVER          0x00000004  Any server running with SQL
	                                       server
	SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_CTRL        0x00000008  Primary domain controller
	SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_BAKCTRL     0x00000010  Backup domain controller
	SV_TYPE_TIME_SOURCE        0x00000020  Server running the timesource
					       service
	SV_TYPE_AFP                0x00000040  Apple File Protocol servers
	SV_TYPE_NOVELL             0x00000080  Novell servers
	SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_MEMBER      0x00000100  Domain Member
	SV_TYPE_PRINTQ_SERVER      0x00000200  Server sharing print queue
	SV_TYPE_DIALIN_SERVER      0x00000400  Server running dialin service.
	SV_TYPE_XENIX_SERVER       0x00000800  Xenix server
	SV_TYPE_NT                 0x00001000  NT server
	SV_TYPE_WFW                0x00002000  Server running Windows for

	SV_TYPE_SERVER_NT          0x00008000  Windows NT non DC server
	SV_TYPE_POTENTIAL_BROWSER  0x00010000  Server that can run the browser
	                                       service
	SV_TYPE_BACKUP_BROWSER     0x00020000  Backup browser server
	SV_TYPE_MASTER_BROWSER     0x00040000  Master browser server
	SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_MASTER      0x00080000  Domain Master Browser server
	SV_TYPE_LOCAL_LIST_ONLY    0x40000000  Enumerate only entries marked
	                                       "local"
	SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_ENUM        0x80000000  Enumerate Domains. The pszServer
	                                       and pszDomain parameters must be
	                                       NULL.

        UINT32        500 - platform_id
        VOID*         pointer to name
        UINT32        5 - major version
        UINT32        4 - minor version
        UINT32        type (SV_TYPE_... bit field)
        VOID*         pointer to comment

        UNISTR2       sv101_name - unicode string of server name
        UNISTR2       sv_101_comment  - unicode string of server comment.

        UINT8[]       padding to get unicode string 4-byte
                      aligned with start of the SMB header.



3) MSRPC over Transact Named Pipe
---------------------------------

For details on the SMB Transact Named Pipe, see cifs6.txt


3.1) MSRPC Pipes
----------------

The MSRPC is conducted over an SMB Transact Pipe with a name of "\PIPE\".
You must first obtain a 16 bit file handle, by sending a SMBopenX with the
pipe name "\PIPE\srvsvc" for example.  You can then perform an SMB Trans,
and must carry out an SMBclose on the file handle once you are finished.

Trans Requests must be sent with two setup UINT16s, no UINT16 params (none
known about), and UINT8 data parameters sufficient to contain the MSRPC
header, and MSRPC data.  The first UINT16 setup parameter must be either
0x0026 to indicate an RPC, or 0x0001 to indicate Set Named Pipe Handle
state.  The second UINT16 parameter must be the file handle for the pipe,
obtained above.

The Data section for an API Command of 0x0026 (RPC pipe) in the Trans
Request is the RPC Header, followed by the RPC Data.  The Data section for
an API Command of 0x0001 (Set Named Pipe Handle state) is two bytes.  The
only value seen for these two bytes is 0x00 0x43.


MSRPC Responses are sent as response data inside standard SMB Trans
responses, with the MSRPC Header, MSRPC Data and MSRPC tail.


It is suspected that the Trans Requests will need to be at least 2-byte
aligned (probably 4-byte).  This is standard practice for SMBs.  It is also
independent of the observed 4-byte alignments with the start of the MSRPC
header, including the 4-byte alignment between the MSRPC header and the
MSRPC data.


First, an SMBtconX connection is made to the IPC$ share.  The connection
must be made using encrypted passwords, not clear-text.  Then, an SMBopenX
is made on the pipe.  Then, a Set Named Pipe Handle State must be sent,
after which the pipe is ready to accept API commands.  Lastly, and SMBclose
is sent.


To be resolved:

    lkcl/01nov97 there appear to be two additional bytes after the null-
    terminated \PIPE\ name for the RPC pipe.  Values seen so far are
    listed below:

        initial SMBopenX request:         RPC API command 0x26 params:

        "\\PIPE\\lsarpc"                  0x65 0x63; 0x72 0x70; 0x44 0x65;
        "\\PIPE\\srvsvc"                  0x73 0x76; 0x4E 0x00; 0x5C 0x43;


3.2) Header
-----------

[section to be rewritten, following receipt of work by Duncan Stansfield]


Interesting note: if you set packed data representation to 0x0100 0000
then all 4-byte and 2-byte word ordering is turned around!

The start of each of the NTLSA and NETLOGON named pipes begins with:

00  UINT8         5 - RPC major version
01  UINT8         0 - RPC minor version
02  UINT8         2 - RPC response packet
03  UINT8         3 - (FirstFrag bit-wise or with LastFrag)
04  UINT32        0x1000 0000 - packed data representation
08  UINT16        fragment length - data size (bytes) inc header and tail.
0A  UINT16        0 - authentication length 
0C  UINT32        call identifier.  matches 12th UINT32 of incoming RPC data.
10  UINT32        allocation hint - data size (bytes) minus header and tail.
14  UINT16        0 - presentation context identifier
16  UINT8         0 - cancel count
17  UINT8         in replies: 0 - reserved; in requests: opnum - see #defines.
18  ......        start of data (goes on for allocation_hint bytes)


RPC_Packet for request, response, bind and bind acknowledgement.
{
  
  UINT8 versionmaj        # reply same as request (0x05)
  UINT8 versionmin        # reply same as request (0x00)
  UINT8 type              # one of the MSRPC_Type enums
  UINT8 flags             # reply same as request (0x00 for Bind, 0x03 for Request)
  UINT32 representation   # reply same as request (0x00000010)
  UINT16 fraglength       # the length of the data section of the SMB trans packet
  UINT16 authlength       
  UINT32 callid           # call identifier. (e.g. 0x00149594)

  * stub USE TvPacket     # the remainder of the packet depending on the "type"
}


# the interfaces are numbered. as yet I haven't seen more than one interface
# used on the same pipe name
# srvsvc
#   abstract (0x4B324FC8, 0x01D31670, 0x475A7812, 0x88E16EBF, 0x00000003)
#   transfer (0x8A885D04, 0x11C91CEB, 0x0008E89F, 0x6048102B, 0x00000002)
RPC_Iface RW
{
  UINT8 byte[16]    # 16 bytes of number
  UINT32 version    # the interface number
}


# the remainder of the packet after the header if "type" was Bind
# in the response header, "type" should be BindAck
RPC_ReqBind RW
{
  UINT16 maxtsize       # maximum transmission fragment size (0x1630)
  UINT16 maxrsize       # max receive fragment size (0x1630)
  UINT32 assocgid       # associated group id (0x0)
  UINT32 numelements    # the number of elements (0x1)
  UINT16 contextid      # presentation context identifier (0x0)
  UINT8 numsyntaxes     # the number of syntaxes (has always been 1?)(0x1)
  UINT8[]               # 4-byte alignment padding, against SMB header

  * abstractint USE RPC_Iface # num and vers. of interface client is using
  * transferint USE RPC_Iface # num and vers. of interface to use for replies
}


RPC_Address RW
{
  UINT16 length        # length of the string including null terminator
  * port USE string    # the string above in single byte, null terminated form
}


# the response to place after the header in the reply packet
RPC_ResBind RW
{
  UINT16 maxtsize                   # same as request
  UINT16 maxrsize                   # same as request
  UINT32 assocgid                   # zero

  * secondaddr USE RPC_Address     # the address string, as described earlier

  UINT8[]                           # 4-byte alignment padding, against SMB header

  UINT8 numresults                  # the number of results (0x01)

  UINT8[]                           # 4-byte alignment padding, against SMB header
  UINT16 result                     # result (0x00 = accept)
  UINT16 reason                     # reason (0x00 = no reason specified)

  * transfersyntax USE RPC_Iface   # the transfer syntax from the request
}


# the remainder of the packet after the header for every other other
# request
RPC_ReqNorm RW
{
  UINT32 allochint         # the size of the stub data in bytes
  UINT16 prescontext       # presentation context identifier (0x0)
  UINT16 opnum             # operation number (0x15)

  * stub USE TvPacket      # a packet dependent on the pipe name
                           # (probably the interface) and the op number)
}


# response to a request
RPC_ResNorm RW
{
  UINT32 allochint         # size of the stub data in bytes
  UINT16 prescontext       # presentation context identifier (same as request)
  UINT8 cancelcount        # cancel count? (0x0)
  UINT8 reserved           # 0 - one byte padding

  * stub USE TvPacket      # the remainder of the reply
}


3.3) Tail
---------

The end of each of the NTLSA and NETLOGON named pipes ends with:

    ......        end of data
    UINT32        return code



3.4 RPC Bind / Bind Ack
-----------------------

RPC Binds are the process of associating an RPC pipe (e.g \PIPE\lsarpc)
with a "transfer syntax" (see RPC_Iface structure).  The purpose for doing
this is unknown.

Note:	The RPC_ResBind SMB Transact request is sent with two uint16 setup
	parameters.  The first is 0x0026; the second is the file handle
	returned by the SMBopenX Transact response.

Note:	The RPC_ResBind members maxtsize, maxrsize and assocgid are the
	same in the response as the same members in the RPC_ReqBind.  The
	RPC_ResBind member transfersyntax is the same in the response as
	the

Note:	The RPC_ResBind response member secondaddr contains the name
	of what is presumed to be the service behind the RPC pipe.  The
	mapping identified so far is:

		initial SMBopenX request:          RPC_ResBind response:

		"\\PIPE\\srvsvc"                   "\\PIPE\\ntsvcs"
		"\\PIPE\\samr"                     "\\PIPE\\lsass"
		"\\PIPE\\lsarpc"                   "\\PIPE\\lsass"
		"\\PIPE\\wkssvc"                   "\\PIPE\\wksvcs"
		"\\PIPE\\NETLOGON"                 "\\PIPE\\NETLOGON"

Note:	The RPC_Packet fraglength member in both the Bind Request and Bind
	Acknowledgment must contain the length of the entire RPC data,
	including the RPC_Packet header.  

Request:

    RPC_Packet
    RPC_ReqBind

Response:

    RPC_Packet
    RPC_ResBind



4) NTLSA Transact Named Pipe
----------------------------
        
The sequence of actions taken on this pipe are:

- Establish a connection to the IPC$ share (SMBtconX).  use encrypted passwords.
- Open an RPC Pipe with the name "\\PIPE\\lsarpc".  Store the file handle.
- Using the file handle, send a Set Named Pipe Handle state to 0x4300.
- Send an LSA Open Policy request.  Store the Policy Handle.
- Using the Policy Handle, send LSA Query Info Policy requests, etc.
- Using the Policy Handle, send an LSA Close.
- Close the IPC$ share.


Defines for this pipe, identifying the query are:

- LSA Open Policy:               0x2c
- LSA Query Info Policy:         0x07
- LSA Enumerate Trusted Domains: 0x0d
- LSA Open Secret:               0xff
- LSA Lookup SIDs:               0xfe
- LSA Lookup Names:              0xfd
- LSA Close:                     0x00


4.1) LSA Open Policy
--------------------

Note:	The policy handle can be anything you like.

Request:

	VOID*     buffer pointer
    UNISTR2   server name - unicode string starting with two '\'s
    OBJ_ATTR  object attributes
    UINT32    1 - desired access

Response:

    POL_HND   LSA policy handle

    return    0 - indicates success


4.2) LSA Query Info Policy
--------------------------

Note:	The info class in response must be the same as that in the request.

Request:

    POL_HND   LSA policy handle
    UINT16    info class (also a policy handle?)

Response:

    VOID*     undocumented buffer pointer
    UINT16    info class (same as info class in request).
    
    switch (info class)
    case 3:
    case 5:
    {
        DOM_INFO domain info, levels 3 and 5 (are the same).
    }

    return    0 - indicates success


4.3) LSA Enumerate Trusted Domains
----------------------------------

Request:

    no extra data

Response:

    UINT32     0 - enumeration context
    UINT32     0 - entries read
    UINT32     0 - trust information

    return     0x8000 001a - "no trusted domains" success code


4.4) LSA Open Secret
--------------------

Request:

    no extra data

Response:

    UINT32    0 - undocumented
    UINT32    0 - undocumented
    UINT32    0 - undocumented
    UINT32    0 - undocumented
    UINT32    0 - undocumented

    return    0x0C00 0034 - "no such secret" success code


4.5) LSA Close
--------------

Request:

    POL_HND   policy handle to be closed

Response:

    POL_HND   0s - closed policy handle (all zeros)

    return    0 - indicates success


4.6) LSA Lookup SIDS
--------------------

Note:	num_entries in response must be same as num_entries in request.

Request:

    POL_HND            LSA policy handle
    UINT32             num_entries
    VOID*              undocumented domain SID buffer pointer
    VOID*              undocumented domain name buffer pointer
    VOID*[num_entries] undocumented domain SID pointers to be looked up.
    DOM_SID[num_entries] domain SIDs to be looked up.
    char[16]           completely undocumented 16 bytes.

Response:

    DOM_REF               domain reference response

    UINT32                num_entries (listed above)
    VOID*                 undocumented buffer pointer

    UINT32                num_entries (listed above)
    DOM_SID2[num_entries] domain SIDs (from Request, listed above).

    UINT32                num_entries (listed above)

    return                0 - indicates success


4.7) LSA Lookup Names
---------------------

Note:	num_entries in response must be same as num_entries in request.

Request:

    POL_HND            LSA policy handle
    UINT32             num_entries
    UINT32             num_entries
    VOID*              undocumented domain SID buffer pointer
    VOID*              undocumented domain name buffer pointer
    NAME[num_entries]  names to be looked up.
    char[]             undocumented bytes - falsely translated SID structure?

Response:

    DOM_REF               domain reference response

    UINT32                num_entries (listed above)
    VOID*                 undocumented buffer pointer

    UINT32                num_entries (listed above)
    DOM_RID[num_entries]  domain SIDs (from Request, listed above).

    UINT32                num_entries (listed above)

    return                0 - indicates success



5) NETLOGON rpc Transact Named Pipe
-----------------------------------

The sequence of actions taken on this pipe are:

- Establish a connection to the IPC$ share (SMBtconX).  use encrypted passwords.
- Open an RPC Pipe with the name "\\PIPE\\NETLOGON".  Store the file handle.
- Using the file handle, send a Set Named Pipe Handle state to 0x4300.
- Create Client Challenge. Send LSA Request Challenge.  Store Server Challenge.
- Calculate Session Key.  Send an LSA Auth 2 Challenge.  Store Auth2 Challenge.
- Calc/Verify Client Creds.  Send LSA Srv PW Set.  Calc/Verify Server Creds.
- Calc/Verify Client Creds.  Send LSA SAM Logon .  Calc/Verify Server Creds.
- Calc/Verify Client Creds.  Send LSA SAM Logoff.  Calc/Verify Server Creds.
- Close the IPC$ share.


Defines for this pipe, identifying the query are:

- LSA Request Challenge:         0x04
- LSA Server Password Set:       0x06
- LSA SAM Logon:                 0x02
- LSA SAM Logoff:                0x03
- LSA Auth 2:                    0x0f
- LSA Logon Control:             0x0e


5.1) LSA Request Challenge
--------------------------

Note:	logon server name starts with two '\' characters and is upper case.

Note:	logon client is the machine, not the user.

Note:	the initial LanManager password hash, against which the challenge
	is issued, is the machine name itself (lower case).  there will be
	calls issued (LSA Server Password Set) which will change this, later.
	refusing these calls allows you to always deal with the same password
	(i.e the LM# of the machine name in lower case).

Request:

    VOID*       undocumented buffer pointer
    UNISTR2     logon server unicode string
    UNISTR2     logon client unicode string
    char[8]     client challenge

Response:

    char[8]     server challenge

    return    0 - indicates success



5.2) LSA Authenticate 2
-----------------------

Note:	in between request and response, calculate the client credentials,
	and check them against the client-calculated credentials (this
	process uses the previously received client credentials).

Note:	neg_flags in the response is the same as that in the request.

Note:	you must take a copy of the client-calculated credentials received
	here, because they will be used in subsequent authentication packets.

Request:

    LOG_INFO    client identification info

    char[8]     client-calculated credentials
    UINT8[]     padding to 4-byte align with start of SMB header.
    UINT32      neg_flags - negotiated flags (usual value is 0x0000 01ff)

Response:

    char[8]     server credentials.
    UINT32      neg_flags - same as neg_flags in request.

    return    0 - indicates success.  failure value unknown.


5.3) LSA Server Password Set
----------------------------

Note:	the new password is suspected to be a DES encryption using the old
	password to generate the key.

Note:	in between request and response, calculate the client credentials,
	and check them against the client-calculated credentials (this
	process uses the previously received client credentials).

Note:	the server credentials are constructed from the client-calculated
	credentials and the client time + 1 second.

Note:	you must take a copy of the client-calculated credentials received
	here, because they will be used in subsequent authentication packets.

Request:

    CLNT_INFO   client identification/authentication info
    char[]      new password - undocumented.
    
Response:

    CREDS       server credentials.  server time stamp appears to be ignored.

    return    0 - indicates success; 0xC000 006a indicates failure


5.4) LSA SAM Logon
------------------

Note:	valid_user is True iff the username and password hash are valid for
	the requested domain.

Request:

    SAM_INFO    sam_id structure

Response:

    VOID*       undocumented buffer pointer
    CREDS       server credentials.  server time stamp appears to be ignored.
    
    if (valid_user)
    {
		UINT16      3 - switch value indicating USER_INFO structure.
        VOID*     non-zero - pointer to USER_INFO structure
        USER_INFO user logon information

        UINT32    1 - Authoritative response; 0 - Non-Auth?

        return    0 - indicates success
    }
    else
    {
		UINT16    0 - switch value.  value to indicate no user presumed.
        VOID*     0x0000 0000 - indicates no USER_INFO structure.

        UINT32    1 - Authoritative response; 0 - Non-Auth?

        return    0xC000 0064 - NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER.
    }


5.5) LSA SAM Logoff
--------------------

Note:	presumably, the SAM_INFO structure is validated, and a (currently
	undocumented) error code returned if the Logoff is invalid.

Request:

    SAM_INFO    sam_id structure

Response:

    VOID*       undocumented buffer pointer
    CREDS       server credentials.  server time stamp appears to be ignored.

    return      0 - indicates success.  undocumented failure indication.


6) \\MAILSLOT\NET\NTLOGON
-------------------------

Note:	mailslots will contain a response mailslot, to which the response
	should be sent.  the target NetBIOS name is REQUEST_NAME<20>, where
	REQUEST_NAME is the name of the machine that sent the request.


6.1) Query for PDC
------------------

Note:	NTversion, LMNTtoken, LM20token in response are the same as those
	given in the request.

Request:

    UINT16         0x0007 - Query for PDC
    STR            machine name
    STR            response mailslot
    UINT8[]        padding to 2-byte align with start of mailslot.
    UNISTR         machine name
    UINT32         NTversion
    UINT16         LMNTtoken
    UINT16         LM20token

Response:

    UINT16         0x000A - Respose to Query for PDC
    STR            machine name (in uppercase)
    UINT8[]        padding to 2-byte align with start of mailslot.
    UNISTR         machine name
    UNISTR         domain name
    UINT32         NTversion (same as received in request)
    UINT16         LMNTtoken (same as received in request)
    UINT16         LM20token (same as received in request)


6.2) SAM Logon
--------------

Note:	machine name in response is preceded by two '\' characters.

Note:	NTversion, LMNTtoken, LM20token in response are the same as those
	given in the request.

Note:	user name in the response is presumably the same as that in the request.

Request:

    UINT16         0x0012 - SAM Logon
    UINT16         request count
    UNISTR         machine name
    UNISTR         user name
    STR            response mailslot
    UINT32         alloweable account
    UINT32         domain SID size
    char[sid_size] domain SID, of sid_size bytes.
    UINT8[]        ???? padding to 4? 2? -byte align with start of mailslot.
    UINT32         NTversion
    UINT16         LMNTtoken
    UINT16         LM20token
    
Response:

    UINT16         0x0013 - Response to SAM Logon
    UNISTR         machine name
    UNISTR         user name - workstation trust account
    UNISTR         domain name 
    UINT32         NTversion
    UINT16         LMNTtoken
    UINT16         LM20token



7) SRVSVC Transact Named Pipe
-----------------------------


Defines for this pipe, identifying the query are:

- Net Share Enum :              0x0f
- Net Server Get Info :         0x15


7.1) Net Share Enum
------------------

Note:	share level and switch value in the response are presumably the 
	same as those in the request.

Note:	cifsrap2.txt (section 5) may be of limited assistance here.

Request:

    VOID*             pointer (to server name?)
	UNISTR2           server name

    UINT8[]           padding to get unicode string 4-byte aligned
                      with the start of the SMB header.

    UINT32            share level
    UINT32            switch value

    VOID*             pointer to SHARE_INFO_1_CTR
    SHARE_INFO_1_CTR  share info with 0 entries

    UINT32            preferred maximum length (0xffff ffff)

Response:

    UINT32            share level
    UINT32            switch value

    VOID*             pointer to SHARE_INFO_1_CTR
    SHARE_INFO_1_CTR  share info (only added if share info ptr is non-zero)

    return            0 - indicates success


7.2) Net Server Get Info
------------------

Note:	level is the same value as in the request.

Request:

	UNISTR2           server name
    UINT32            switch level

Response:

    UINT32            switch level
    VOID*             pointer to SERVER_INFO_101

    SERVER_INFO_101   server info (only added if server info ptr is non-zero)

    return            0 - indicates success



Appendix
--------

A1) Cryptographic side of NT Domain Authentication
--------------------------------------------------


A1.1) Definitions
-----------------

Add(A1,A2): Intel byte ordered addition of corresponding 4 byte words
in arrays A1 and A2

E(K,D): DES ECB encryption of 8 byte data D using 7 byte key K

lmowf(): Lan man hash

ntowf(): NT hash

PW: md4(machine_password) == md4(lsadump $machine.acc) ==
pwdump(machine$) (initially) == md4(lmowf(unicode(machine)))

ARC4(K,Lk,D,Ld): ARC4 encryption of data D of length Ld with key K of
length Lk

v[m..n(,l)]: subset of v from bytes m to n, optionally padded with
zeroes to length l

Cred(K,D): E(K[7..7,7],E(K[0..6],D)) computes a credential

Time(): 4 byte current time

Cc,Cs: 8 byte client and server challenges Rc,Rs: 8 byte client and
server credentials


A1.2) Protocol
--------------

C->S ReqChal,Cc S->C Cs

C & S compute session key Ks = E(PW[9..15],E(PW[0..6],Add(Cc,Cs)))

C: Rc = Cred(Ks,Cc) C->S Authenticate,Rc S: Rs = Cred(Ks,Cs),
assert(Rc == Cred(Ks,Cc)) S->C Rs C: assert(Rs == Cred(Ks,Cs))

On joining the domain the client will optionally attempt to change its
password and the domain controller may refuse to update it depending
on registry settings. This will also occur weekly afterwards.

C: Tc = Time(), Rc' = Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc) C->S ServerPasswordSet,Rc',Tc,
arc4(Ks[0..7,16],lmowf(randompassword()) C: Rc = Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc+1) S:
assert(Rc' == Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc)), Ts = Time() S: Rs' = Cred(Ks,Rs+Tc+1)
S->C Rs',Ts C: assert(Rs' == Cred(Ks,Rs+Tc+1)) S: Rs = Rs'

User: U with password P wishes to login to the domain (incidental data
such as workstation and domain omitted)

C: Tc = Time(), Rc' = Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc) C->S NetLogonSamLogon,Rc',Tc,U,
arc4(Ks[0..7,16],16,ntowf(P),16), arc4(Ks[0..7,16],16,lmowf(P),16) S:
assert(Rc' == Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc)) assert(passwords match those in SAM) S:
Ts = Time()

S->C Cred(Ks,Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc+1)),userinfo(logon script,UID,SIDs,etc) C:
assert(Rs == Cred(Ks,Cred(Rc+Tc+1)) C: Rc = Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc+1)


A1.3) Comments
--------------

On first joining the domain the session key could be computed by
anyone listening in on the network as the machine password has a well
known value. Until the machine is rebooted it will use this session
key to encrypt NT and LM one way functions of passwords which are
password equivalents. Any user who logs in before the machine has been
rebooted a second time will have their password equivalent exposed. Of
course the new machine password is exposed at this time anyway.

None of the returned user info such as logon script, profile path and
SIDs *appear* to be protected by anything other than the TCP checksum.

The server time stamps appear to be ignored.

The client sends a ReturnAuthenticator in the SamLogon request which I
can't find a use for.  However its time is used as the timestamp
returned by the server.

The password OWFs should NOT be sent over the network reversibly
encrypted. They should be sent using ARC4(Ks,md4(owf)) with the server
computing the same function using the owf values in the SAM.


A2) SIDs and RIDs
-----------------

SIDs and RIDs are well documented elsewhere.

A SID is an NT Security ID (see DOM_SID structure).  They are of the form:

	S-revision-NN-SubAuth1-SubAuth2-SubAuth3... 
	S-revision-0xNNNNNNNNNNNN-SubAuth1-SubAuth2-SubAuth3...

currently, the SID revision is 1.
The Sub-Authorities are known as Relative IDs (RIDs).


A2.1) Well-known SIDs
---------------------


A2.1.1) Universal well-known SIDs
---------------------------------

	Null SID                     S-1-0-0
	World                        S-1-1-0
	Local                        S-1-2-0
	Creator Owner ID             S-1-3-0
	Creator Group ID             S-1-3-1
	Creator Owner Server ID      S-1-3-2
	Creator Group Server ID      S-1-3-3
	
	(Non-unique IDs)             S-1-4


A2.1.2) NT well-known SIDs
--------------------------

	NT Authority          S-1-5
	Dialup                S-1-5-1

	Network               S-1-5-2
	Batch                 S-1-5-3
	Interactive           S-1-5-4
	Service               S-1-5-6
	AnonymousLogon        S-1-5-7       (aka null logon session)
	Proxy                 S-1-5-8
	ServerLogon           S-1-5-8       (aka domain controller account)
	
	(Logon IDs)           S-1-5-5-X-Y
	
	(NT non-unique IDs)   S-1-5-0x15-...
	
	(Built-in domain)     s-1-5-0x20
	


A2.2) Well-known RIDS
---------------------

A RID is a sub-authority value, as part of either a SID, or in the case
of Group RIDs, part of the DOM_GID structure, in the USER_INFO_1
structure, in the LSA SAM Logon response.


A2.2.1) Well-known RID users
----------------------------

	DOMAIN_USER_RID_ADMIN          0x0000 01F4
	DOMAIN_USER_RID_GUEST          0x0000 01F5



A2.2.2) Well-known RID groups
----------------------------

	DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_ADMINS        0x0000 0200
	DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_USERS         0x0000 0201
	DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_GUESTS        0x0000 0202



A2.2.3) Well-known RID aliases
------------------------------

	DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS        0x0000 0220
	DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_USERS         0x0000 0221
	DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_GUESTS        0x0000 0222
	DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_POWER_USERS   0x0000 0223

	DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ACCOUNT_OPS   0x0000 0224
	DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_SYSTEM_OPS    0x0000 0225
	DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_PRINT_OPS     0x0000 0226
	DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_BACKUP_OPS    0x0000 0227

	DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_REPLICATOR    0x0000 0228


