





INTERNET-DRAFT                                            S. Varshavchik
Expires XXX XX, XXXX                              Double Precision, Inc.
                                                            XXX XX, XXXX

                    SECURITY SMTP Service Extension
                 draft-varshavchik-security-smtpext.txt

Status Of This Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at

   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
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0. Revision history

1. Abstract

   This document describes an [ESMTP] extension that enables the sender
   to explicitly indicate the transport security level the mail system
   must use in delivering the given message.

   The SECURITY extension can also be used to establish secure mail
   delivery channels between trusted hosts, connected by an untrusted
   public network.

2. Introduction

   [STARTTLS] defines an SMTP service extension for using TLS/SSL to
   send mail between ESMTP mail relays. [STARTTLS] is an optional SMTP
   extension, but sometimes the sender might wish to require that
   [STARTTLS], or an equivalent, must be used to deliver a particular
   message.  Even if two mail nodes - the sending and the receiving



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   nodes - are set up to use [STARTTLS], there are known methods of
   attack - such as [DNS] cache poisoning - which can be used to
   intercept mail traffic.

3. Framework for the SECURITY SMTP transport extension

   This [ESMTP] transport extension is laid out as follows.

      (1) The name of the SMTP transport extension defined here is
          Message Security Level.

      (2) The EHLO keyword associated with this extension is SECURITY.

      (3) The SECURITY EHLO keyword takes a comma-delimited list as a
          parameter.

      (4) One optional ESMTP keyword SECURITY is associated with the
          MAIL FROM command. This parameter takes a comma-delimited list
          as a parameter.

      (5) No additional ESMTP verbs are defined by this extension.

      (6) The next section specifies how support for this extension
          affects the behavior of a server and client SMTP.

4. The SECURITY SMTP extension

   The EHLO keyword SECURITY takes a comma-separated list of words as an
   argument.  This document defines two words that may appear in the
   EHLO SECURITY list:

          NONE      - No security.

          STARTTLS  - Must use STARTTLS to deliver the message.


   The optional SECURITY ESMTP keyword to the MAIL FROM command MUST use
   one of these words as a parameter (if the SECURITY keyword is
   provided at all).  This is used to select the requested security
   level in transmitting this message

   SECURITY=NONE essentially requests no security whatsoever, for this
   message.  It is equivalent to complete absence of an explicit
   SECURITY setting.

   SECURITY=STARTTLS specifies that the mail relay MUST use [STARTTLS]
   with a remote mail node.  The mail relay ignores this option if it
   delivers the message to a local mailbox.  The sending mail relay MUST



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   also verify the X.509 certificate received from the remote mail relay
   during TLS negotiation.  The remote relay's X.509 certificate MUST be
   signed by a certificate authority that is known and trusted by the
   sending relay.  If the remote relay does not support [STARTTLS], or
   is unable to provide a satisfactory X.509 certificate, the message
   MUST be returned as undeliverable.

   Note that [STARTTLS] allows the mail node to initially advertise
   STARTTLS as its only [ESMTP] extension, until TLS is established.
   Therefore, TLS MUST be established first, before checking for the
   SECURITY [ESMTP] extension.

   Note that after TLS is established, the EHLO no longer shows
   STARTTLS, since TLS is already being used, and EHLO will now list the
   SECURITY keyword without a STARTTLS keyword.  SECURITY may also
   appear without STARTTLS even if TLS has not been established.  This
   situation may happen with a connection over an internal, secure
   network, to a mail firewall, essentially instructing the mail
   firewall to use SECURITY to deliver the message over an external
   network, even though TLS is not necessary to forward the mail from
   the sender over the secure, internal, network.

   A mail relay MAY automatically "upgrade" the SECURITY level of a
   message based on the mail relay's administrative policies.  A node
   MUST NOT automatically downgrade the SECURITY level.  For the purpose
   of determining the security level SECURITY=STARTTLS is considered to
   be more secure than SECURITY=NONE.  This allows the implementation of
   a secure mail delivery framework between trusted nodes, over an
   untrusted network, without any modification to existing mail user
   agents.

5. Example

       220 example.com ESMTP
       EHLO domain.com
       250-example.com ESMTP
       250 STARTTLS
       STARTTLS
       220 Go ahead.
       _(_T_L_S _n_e_g_o_t_i_a_t_i_o_n _t_a_k_e_s _p_l_a_c_e_)
       EHLO domain.com
       250-example.com ESMTP
       250-SECURITY=NONE,STARTTLS
       250-SIZE
       250-DSN
       250 HELP
       MAIL FROM:<itny-out@domain.com> SIZE=1250 SECURITY=STARTTLS
       250 Ok



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       _(_N_o_r_m_a_l _S_M_T_P _d_i_a_l_o_g_u_e _c_o_n_t_i_n_u_e_s_._._._)

6. Delivery Status Notifications

   [DSN] messages generated for a message with any SECURITY keyword MUST
   also use the same SECURITY keyword for the DSN.  This is because DSNs
   may include portions of the original message.  The presumption is
   that if a secure path existed between the sender, and the DSN-
   generating node, a return secure path also exists.

7. Security concerns

   Note that it is not necessary for a mail client to negotiate TLS/SSL
   in order to submit the message for delivery.  A mail node SHOULD
   advertise and enable SECURITY in both plaintext and TLS/SSL-secured
   sessions.

   The SECURITY extension allows a fairly straightforward way to set up
   a secure mail transmission infrastructure between trusted hosts over
   a public, untrusted, network.  This is done by installing X.509
   certificates signed by a trusted certificate authority, then using
   SECURITY to require [STARTTLS] (or configuring the mail relay's
   configuration to automatically upgrade SECURITY for outgoing
   messages).

   The trusted CA must be a private CA that is used only by these nodes.
   The secure mail traffic can still be intercepted if a public CA is
   used.  This is because other techniques, such as IP address spoofing
   or [DNS] cache poisoning, can be used to redirect mail to a node with
   a valid certificate signed by a public CA.

   Note that a trusted mail node CAN use DNS cache poisoning to
   intercept mail addressed to another trusted mail node, since the
   attacker will have a certificate signed by the private CA.  It is
   important to understand that the SECURITY extension is designed to
   defend against attacks from untrusted mail nodes only.

   The SECURITY extension's scope is limited to delivery of a message to
   the recipient's mailbox.  Once a message is delivered, it is the
   recipient's responsibility to access the message in a secure
   environment, such as by using SSL/TLS-wrapped versions of existing
   mailbox access protocols.

8. References

   [ESMTP]    Klensin, J., Freed, N., Rose, M., Stefferud, E., Crocker,
              D.  "SMTP Service Extensions", RFC 1425, United Nations
              University, Innosoft International, Inc., Dover Beach



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              Consulting, Inc., Network Management Associates, Inc., The
              Branch Office, February 1993

   [STARTTLS] Hoffman, P., "SMTP Service Extension for Secure SMTP over
              TLS", RFC 2487, Internet Mail Consortium, January 1999

   [DSN]      Moore, K. "SMTP Service Extension for Delivery Status
              Notifications", RFC 1891, University of Tennessee, January
              1996.

   [DNS]      Mockapetris, P., "Domain Names - Implementation and
              Specification", RFC 1035, ISI, November 1987

9. Author's address

   Sam Varshavchik
   Double Precision, Inc.
   PO Box 668
   Greenwood Lake, NY 10925
   <sam@courier-mta.com>































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